What Is Vučić Hiding from Serbia?

When Aleksandar Vučić states: “Our central bank can receive secondary sanctions at any moment for failing to issue a binding instruction to cease cooperation with a sanctioned company,” he thereby confirms that he persistently defends the interests of the majority owner of NIS, a Russian state company, and that he is prepared to do so even at the cost of the complete economic collapse of the country of which he is president. This is the definition of high treason, of conscious, unconstitutional conduct, and confirmation that Serbia is led by a third-rate governor of Putin. For at least 11 months, Vučić has been protecting Russian interests by illegally interfering in the work of the so-called Government of Serbia, preventing the adoption of measures that would stop the operation of NIS and the chain reaction that will hit both citizens and the economy. GP Solidarity has a duty to inform citizens what secondary sanctions against the National Bank would bring in the shortest possible time:

International payment operations would be shut down – foreign banks would terminate correspondent relations with the National Bank of Serbia, SWIFT channels connected to the NBS would collapse, companies would be unable to pay for imports (oil, medicines, consumer goods), citizens would be unable to normally receive money from abroad, and card payments abroad could be cut off.

Commercial banks in Serbia would enter a state of panic – foreign banks would not sacrifice access to the U.S. financial system for the sake of doing business with a central bank under secondary sanctions, so they would withdraw part of their liquidity, impose additional restrictions on foreign-currency payments, and, if the sanctions persisted, be ready to withdraw from Serbia entirely.

The NBS would no longer be able to defend the dinar exchange rate – the dinar would sharply weaken, imports would become more expensive, inflation would accelerate, and the living standard of citizens would enter a zone of free fall.

The state would lose access to financing, making public debt risky – Serbia partly finances itself through the issuance of eurobonds, borrowing from international financial institutions, and placing securities with domestic and foreign investors. Secondary sanctions would trigger an investor flight from bonds, a sharp rise in interest rates, make new borrowing almost impossible, and render refinancing of existing debt problematic. This would mean budget cuts and sudden pressure to reduce salaries, pensions, or investments.

Sanctions on the NBS would “nail” Serbia into geopolitical isolation – EU integration would effectively come to a halt, relations with the United States would be long-term damaged, Serbia would become a toxic destination for serious investors, and good companies would be forced to withdraw.

Secondary sanctions would bring mass layoffs, inflation, shortages, and rapid impoverishment of ordinary citizens, along with sanction-driven enrichment of people close to the regime. The only remaining options for mere survival would become Russian, Chinese, and Gulf capital under the worst, near-slave conditions. We are certain that enough people in Aleksandar Vučić’s inner circle are aware of this, so the question arises: is the risk of secondary sanctions and their inevitable consequences the hidden intention of those committing high treason?